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Sovereignty: Some considerations
Ian Duncanson
And because the name of tyranny signifieth nothing more nor less than the 
name of sovereignty, be it in one or many men, saving that they that use 
the former word are understood to be angry with them they call tyrants, 
I think that the professed hatred of tyranny is a toleration of hatred to the 
common-wealth in general and another evil seed (Hobbes 1968: 32).
When we enquire by what means … the many are governed by the few … 
we shall find that force is always on the side of the governed, the governors 
have nothing to support them but belief. It is therefore on opinion only 
that government is founded (Hume 1987: 32).
The purpose of this paper is to assert that sovereignty is not a useful 
doctrine when applied domestically in modern times in the form it 
often assumes, namely a locus of legal or political authority which has 
an existence beyond the political system governed by it and which 
may therefore have resort to extraordinary power in exceptional 
circumstances. The conviction that this must be so has gained the status 
of common sense in some circles: after all, must the state not have 
emergency powers to protect itself ? But what is ‘itself ’? — a question 
that arises whenever ‘state’ infrastructure is sold to largely wealthy 
purchasers. Is the state not the taxpayers’ agent? Why should they be 
asked to pay over again for assets they already own?
Yet the notion that emergency powers always already exist in 
potentia beyond the community of persons who lay claim to constitute 
the state by their membership of it carries enormous dangers. Who 
decides if there is an emergency? People either sufficiently mendacious 
or incompetent that they see threats to state security in every foreign 
garbage bin?  If it is the sovereign who must decide, and if the sovereign 
is at the same time defined by the capacity to own that power of 
decision, the reasoning is circular and viciously so, for the temptation 
to lower the threshold of emergency or to use it opportunistically must 
be seen as in all likelihood irresistible. As we have seen.
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The idea, too, that all legitimate authority in the state, symbolised 
by its law, originates directly from or is delegated by a sovereign of 
this kind, as Bentham has it (Hart 1970: ch 1), is an archaic relic 
believed in by few but some lawyers and the more mystically inclined 
political theorists. It is the trace of the transition from feudalism to 
absolutism. Although assuming different forms in different places, 
European absolutism long ago represented the aspirations of feudal 
monarchy’s ultimately successful campaign to reduce the patchwork 
of baronial jurisdictions that succeeded the collapse of the Western 
Roman Empire and to create central foci of military power outside 
the mutual obligations of feudal lordship (Anderson 1974: ch 2).
Absolutism as it was developed in the major European kingdoms 
simultaneously broke the power of the peerage and challenged the 
more precocious medieval city states’ financial power in the south 
— of Venice and of the Lombards, for example. Something grander 
still haunted Western thought but it was not to be realised, if fantasies 
can be realised, until European impositions on America and Asia. 
Charlemagne imagined himself as a successor of the Roman Emperor, 
if far to the north. But culturally outclassed, and militarily humiliated 
by the Arabs, by the Magyar threat from the east and the Scandinavian 
incursions from the north, all of which were to turn Europe into a 
backwater under siege, Charlemagne’s Carolingian successors certainly 
did not bring about a renewal of the glories of Rome (Bloch 1965: ch 
1, 2).  Gregorian ambitions for a Christendom, the rule of Christ on 
earth, may have been more pretentious and perhaps crueler, driven by 
a theocracy incapable of distinguishing Christian diversity from the 
‘Saracen’ enemy or of recognising that enemy as an equal humanity 
entitled to its difference. But, as Frances Yates writes, this ‘phantom’ 
of Rome had stalked through European thought since Rome’s fifth-
century end in the west (Yates 1975: 41). Charlemagne saw himself 
not only as the head of the earthly city, as opposed to Augustine’s 




As all the powers within an individual man must be under one ruler, 
his intellectual power, as there must be one man to rule a family, the 
paterfamilias; one to rule a city; one to rule a kingdom; so there must be 
one to rule the universal world (Yates 1975: 9).
Whether the Crusades, designed to establish a Christian European 
dominion (Berman 1983: ch 2, 5), the establishment of the ecclesiastical 
legal canon derived from Roman law, the slightly later purging of Jews 
and Muslims from Iberia, the beginning of the attempt at genocide 
by the Spanish in America, are all coincidental, may be doubted. 
The connected and neurotic compulsion to certainty and unity are 
too plain to ignore. Obviously not a complete catalogue of European 
imperial endeavours, they all exemplify purposeful manifestations 
of an imperialist urge to unitary sovereign power. Arguably, they 
produced and re-produced new certainties and I shall mention later 
the connections that can be made between epistemology and political 
action. Luther’s and Calvin’s vigorous convictions, and the equally 
fierce counter-reformation associated with the Tridentine Council, 
were all within a few decades of the Iberian expulsions and the 
arrivals of the Conquistadores in the Americas. If, as some argue, 
the Renaissance began not with the Italians but in Moorish Spain 
by the 1500s, a newly self-confident Europe was prepared to reject 
Muslim effeteness and banish and murder its human embodiments. 
Its own multiple schisms — true Catholic and heretic, Protestant and 
Catholic, true and false protestantisms — were more than ready to 
murder each of their enemies in the name of faith and certainty. But 
as certainties multiplied, perhaps a fear was also gaining momentum 
among Europeans, whom the Arabs had known collectively as Franks 
during the two centuries of the Crusades, and in stories repeated orally 
for centuries after, as brutal and ignorant. If the Europeans had become 
yet more brutal, the fear may have been about their own safety from 
themselves. This is what Hobbes perceived, and surely what frightened 
him. Here is the paradox. We can all make ourselves certain; there is 
indeed a certain illusory security in that; and Protestantism brought 
matters to a head on all sides.
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Christianity, then, acquired a zeal in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries that it had not exhibited since the Crusades. How are issues 
not considered consistent with each other to be resolved when the 
other fellows are plainly mistaken and probably wicked, except at 
the point of a sword or a matchlock, the imperial solution familiar, 
of course, from the Crusades and more recently from the ‘new’ world 
of Castilian Spain and its overseas empire? Moreover, the problem 
was not confined to ‘religion’ in its narrow sense, although it used 
religious vocabulary for a long period. If I cannot see inside another’s 
head, rational prudence dictates the possibility that he or she may mean 
me harm. When the threat is embodied, as it must be, in a person or 
body of persons in a kind of antidote to the Yeatsian ‘the centre cannot 
hold’, it impliedly addresses a supposed dichotomy in social life: order 
or anarchy; prosperous, if coerced, cooperation or the impoverishing 
claim of all to all. Perhaps when too much stress resides here, the 
conflation made by Hobbes of tyranny with commonwealth becomes at 
length irresistible. The stress of uncertainty gives way to a yearning for 
a strong master, a father above and beyond the control of his children, 
to assume responsibility. And what, therefore, as Arendt was to write 
of Eichmann, renders one freer than a strong master?
Sovereignty retains, for this reason, its seductive charm for 
some, and the 2006 Wollongong Law and Society conference, ‘The 
Protection of Law: Right or Racket’, at which a version of this paper 
was originally presented, provided a refreshing opportunity for 
raising the relation of sovereignty and law as an issue, implying not 
only that law may be seen to be on the side of the good or on that of 
the fraudulent and exploitative, but that, in all of its guises, it may be 
part of the problem of social order and justice. Al Capone’s ‘racket’ of 
course was ‘protection’ from his gang — a tax which, if left unpaid, 
would risk dire consequences of damage, injury or death. When paid, 
prosperity and safety were likely, a victory over one’s opponents and an 
albeit contemptuous blessing from one’s protectors a distinct possibility. 
Failure to pay the tax naturally spelled ruin for the debtor. But, under 
a system in which law is commodified, how different is right? If I can 
afford expensive lawyers and protracted litigation and you cannot, you 
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must accept my terms. Lawyers, the title of the conference asks us to 
query, may be just another gang whose protection we buy.
In the shadow of a war of opposing religious and political 
fundamentalisms in the seventeenth century, it seemed to Hobbes that 
the order that could resolve the racket, the only order that could reliably 
be maintained, was one achieved not by a continuously renewed 
adherence to a reconciling law but by strong rule, specifically by one 
or a group outside and above the conflict which law had hitherto 
been incapable of resolving — by a sovereign to whom all political, 
moral and legal authority had been ceded. Dissent was dangerous. It 
led, famously, to the war of all against all, the cold war of suspicion, 
with which we are deeply familiar, and potentially the hot war of 
blows. This Hobbesian view, largely resisted in the century after his 
writing, became an important component in the ideology of late 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideologies of empire. As late as 
the twentieth century, imperial rule from a metropolis beyond the 
governed communities was justified as all that saved ‘native’ societies 
from descent into irrational chaos (see the summary in Wilson 2007 
and Hall 2007). The Indian insurrection of 1857, that of Morant Bay in 
Jamaica in 1864, Amritsar in the last century, and the tragic Partition 
wars at the end of the Raj all supply imperial diehards with support 
for their conviction that this was always the case. The part played 
by European adventurism in producing these events is conveniently 
overlooked from this perspective.
The possibilities for tragic or unpleasant outcomes, then, for 
a population governed by those exceptional to it are obvious — 
summarised, Hannah Arendt reminds us, in the German jurisprudential 
concept of ‘Act of State’, ‘even more tellingly in German … gerichtsfrei 
or justizlose Hoheitsakte’ (Arendt 1994: 49).  It is an encouragement, 
or a disincentive, to think, as she puts it, to make the effort to see the 
other’s point of view in the case of difference or disagreement; and 
this is the context in which, she writes, the ‘banality of evil’ manifests 
itself. In this space, Eichmann carried out his orders, not sadistically, 
but merely without seeing the need to consider the ethics or the 
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consequences. In Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay — and in the 
predictably absurd terminology of ‘rendition’, whereby victims not 
convicted of any offence are sent to regimes instructed, even assisted, by 
that tower of democracy the United States, with its hitherto craven ally 
Australia, to inflict torture — are reminders that Western governments 
are never far from creating such contexts (see Rothschild 2007 and 
Zinn 2007). Torture, humiliation and firm, paternalist discipline are 
the administrative tools required to transform a squabbling mob into 
responsible adults capable of self-government. Lies, fear campaigns, fake 
motives, are all part of a necessary means to an ostensibly good end.
The argument of this paper, to reiterate, is that the danger of 
authoritarianism is always inherent when the ultimate legitimacy, 
the foundational authority of the state, is conceived as beyond the 
community from which its citizens derive their identity. It always has 
imperial overtones. Bentham (1988: 3) set his work in the context of 
the ‘perfection’ of scientific advances, the European conquest of nature 
and ‘the most distant and recondite regions of the earth traversed and 
explored’ by Europeans. His disciple John Austin considered himself a 
cartographer and giver of order to what was in common law apparently 
arbitrary and unconnected, perhaps like native visions of the world 
(Austin 1955: 379). Fitzpatrick notes the colonialist assumptions in 
Hart’s schematic anthropology, which maps ‘pre-legal’ societies onto 
modern societies and finds them wanting. In pre-legal societies there 
are only simple or primary norms, requiring or forbidding certain 
behaviour. Modern societies, with proper law, have, in addition to 
primary rules, secondary rules, creating institutional means, such as 
courts and legislature, for changing primary rules. In Ronald Dworkin 
(1986), the agents of change have become the American Legal Realists’ 
social engineering judges, the princes of the crassly titled Law’s Empire, 
although Dworkin’s judges are somewhat more conservative. They 
do not rule on what must be, only on what has always already been, 
if unseen by punier men, those who lack the biceps pictured on the 
cover of the paperback 1986 edition of the text.  In one way or another 
a knowing subject, or possibly a sudden action from without, resolves 
confusion and brings law.  The possibility of an acceptable, law-free Act 
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of State haunts much jurisprudential thinking. Even Jacques Derrida 
(1990) finds the expression ‘We the people of the United States’ in need 
of some grammatical gymnastics to justify it. How could a people be 
constituted before the constitution that constitutes them as a people? 
As New Zealand Solicitor-General and leading jurist Salmond (1920: 
124) wrote just after World War I:
It is requisite that the law should postulate one or more first causes, whose 
operation is ultimate and whose authority is underived.
Democracy itself can seem to have a violent beginning (Ross 
2004). Yet if the danger of authority’s being even conceivably outside, 
unaccountable to constitutional restraint, is, as we have seen, present 
in the most unpredictable of places — if fear can be invoked by 
unscrupulous rulers — authority may so conceive itself, and treat others 
too, as outside and beyond. But how else are we to think of authority? 
Does it, could it, not always come from a beyond?
What is sometimes forgotten is that in 1688 the English political 
classes gave government to themselves, assembling in a convention 
parliament without a king, having removed the ruling monarch 
because he posed a threat to what had come, during almost a century 
of struggle, to be the sanctified association of property, liberty and the 
independence of gentlemen to decide on the mode of their government. 
The Scots parliament may have felt the need to find constitutional 
grounds for deposing the monarch they shared with England, but the 
English Houses did not. They were prepared to act pragmatically in 
order not to provoke unnecessary dissension and to ground legitimate 
authority on, precisely, the shifting bases of convention, agreement 
and re-agreement.
And this brings us to the quotation from Hume. Hobbes — the 
geometer, convinced that the truth was measurably out there and that 
he had glimpsed it — believed that the route from the terrifying state of 
nature was discoverable by the use of human reason correctly used, in 
the way contemporaries believed Isosceles and the other Greek heroes 
to have worked. A little later Hume and his immediate predecessors 
and contemporaries, on the other hand, linked understanding the world 
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and acting in it in a more quotidian and less absolute sense. Writing in 
an era very different from that of Hobbes — one in which a solution 
to earlier conflict had developed new dimensions — epistemological 
questions about thought and belief acquired more significance in the 
production and maintenance of order. The thinkers with arguably the 
most social and political influence, until British conquests in India and 
the task of governing brown people without their consent prompted 
renewed interest in Hobbesian notions of sovereignty (see Dirks 2006, 
especially ch 5), adopted a defeasible ‘as if ’. For Victorian reformers, 
with their problems of ruling brown people, women, the feckless poor, 
of course the content of law must constantly adapt to changing social 
circumstances, but the form of law was a given in ‘advanced’ societies 
even where, like the coastlines and continents being mapped by the 
Admiralty, and the laws of physics, it had continually to be clarified 
according to positivist scientific principles.
For the Victorians’ predecessors, by contrast, an inquiring subject 
does not expect to find a world that mirrors his or her thoughts about 
it, but adopts strategies that seem best adapted to how things seem until 
the strategies no longer work. Dogmatism and certainties are no longer 
options. One is tempted to understand sovereignty from the point of 
view of these late seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century 
post–civil war writers by invoking the memorable phrase coined by 
the American Legal Realists in the twentieth century: ‘there is no 
there there’; ‘its’ existence and form had for the eighteenth-century 
gentry, and those much below, to be discussed in a seemly way; and 
the manner of seemliness, not its ultimate object — since there was 
none — was of central importance. The norms were broached in times 
of social distress, dragoons might sometimes be dispatched, but often 
with such disastrous results that negotiation with those distressed was 
the preferred option. Of course for Hobbes himself sovereignty was 
not entirely there either but had sternly to be created and accepted as 
a condition of peace and thereafter rigorously maintained at risk of 
society’s falling once more into the chaos of the state of nature.
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In Locke’s experience, sovereignty in the form claimed by the 
Stuart monarchy had been attempted as a practice of government 
as a living performance, with personally dangerous and nationally 
disastrous consequences for himself and his country. Locke and his 
successors were for that reason more subtle, less sure of themselves 
and their ideas, scientific and social (between which categories, for 
political purposes, they made no absolute distinction), less absolute. 
And, save for the brief flirtation with sovereignty among white men 
that led to the downfall of the Atlantic empire after 1776 (Simms 
2007), the British route to order among themselves avoided the pitfalls 
of sovereignty as the beyond (despite the particularly noisy bluster of 
lawyers in the wake of Bentham, through James Fitzjames Stephen 
to Dicey) and followed a generally cultural route, the difficult and 
far from perfect production of social coherence through manners and 
politeness and, later, education.
Locke approached what he considered the compound of science and 
art involved in social analysis and action allusively and with a remarkably 
modern-sounding approach to knowledge and understanding. He 
wrote of the heuristic process of ‘framing ideas’: these are not ‘precise 
imitations of anything that really exists’ but devices ‘for the easier and 
readier improvement and communication’ of the understanding (Locke 
1979: 420, 431).  In a posthumously published essay on the science 
of astronomy, Adam Smith (1982: 105) said much the same: the laws 
through which scientists try to grasp reality are not part of reality, 
but dwell in the creative imaginations of the inquirers and so will 
in time change. The sovereign-beyond, the mystical beginning, the 
ambiguous outside/inside, if we apply this reasoning, is not an empirical 
component of an ordered community but a presupposition that we 
make or are sometimes misguidedly persuaded to make, especially if 
we do not, in Arendt’s terms, ‘think’ — a presupposition to which 
we then respond, perhaps absolving ourselves from responsibility, but 
certainly by conferring more power on leadership than is necessary.
Arendt distinguishes the British Whig tradition, from which the 
American Revolution sprang, from the Bourbon absolutism which 
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provoked and gave a vocabulary for the French Revolution. The first two 
do not assume an ‘outside’ origin for government legitimacy and law, 
which invite us to concede the possibility of a state of exception, a realm 
of acts of state beyond reach of the community, but rather a convention 
among the governed regarding the practices of self-government. With 
an inheritance of divine origins, the monarch as carrying out God’s 
will on earth, France resorted, on the dissolution of the office of God’s 
anointed, to the people’s or general will which, as Arendt, and Edmund 
Burke long before, pointed out, required human intervention in order to 
function, and found it in Robespierre and the Terror (Arendt 1973).
The Whigs did not risk creating a sovereign over and above 
themselves. The convention that Parliament cannot legislatively bind 
itself, far from an assertion of Parliamentary sovereignty, is the design 
that it is an assembly that governs by consent — at least that of the political 
classes. Since consent will seldom be signaled by unanimity, the next 
best thing is consent by subsequently defeasible majority. Parliament 
itself, in the evolving conventionally and largely Whig plan, consisted 
of the monarch who would act executively through his or her ministers 
in Parliament subject to their having the confidence of Commons and 
Lords. After 1701 the common law judges had security of tenure (Plumb 
1967). This was the famous ‘balanced constitution’.
We might note here Hannah Arendt’s observation that the 
Americans, also, did not adopt the inside/outside notion of sovereignty 
emerging, as she notes, from the Whig tradition which they believed 
the ministries of George III to be sabotaging:
In the long run, perhaps the greatest American innovation in politics as 
such was the consistent abolition of sovereignty within the body politic 
of the republic, the insight that in the realm of human affairs sovereignty 
and tyranny are the same (Arendt 1973: 153).
Momentarily, in the proper sense, she forgot the Whigs. The 
Americans were not, indeed, a ‘we, the people of the United States’ 
avant la lettre. They were, as Arendt had already observed, even then 
existing political associations (of white men) with elected assemblies 
that organised their own supply. They were also, as Fetter (1976) tells 
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us, as or more determined than the Latitudinarian Whigs to create 
a secular state in which personal beliefs might be respected, one 
also in which legitimate authority was divided and ‘balanced’. The 
original emigration to America had been to some extent in search of 
those religious freedoms imperfectly achieved by the parties to the 
Convention of 1688, but this was only possible where God was seen 
as ‘the ultimate good chap’, in Paxman’s phrase. The 1776 Declaration 
describes the desire of those in whose authority the delegates assembled 
at the Continental congress of the united colonies to re-form each of 
them each as sovereign states, united in light of their opposition to 
George’s ministries’ invasion of the rights of free-born Englishmen. 
At that point they agree in the Articles of Confederation to ‘stile’ 
themselves the United States of America (the Declaration refers to 
the united (lower case) States of America), the later Constitution 
recognising the need for greater union.
The sentiment of balance, tolerance in face of uncertainty and 
pragmatism was pervasive. The impudence of the Americans in acting 
out what many in Britain believed — that the executive was arrogating 
to itself too much power — generated some British patriotism, and 
Pitt’s Parliamentary reformist ambitions were then drowned in the 
French wars following the Revolution; but the conviction of an 
agreement beyond law and sovereignty of an absolutist kind survived. 
Earlier it had taken the form of, as we have seen, a convention of 
gentlemen, including the invited monarch, upon how government was 
to be managed, trade aggressively maintained and empire defended 
towards commerce’s ends. The ‘ungovernable people’ were included 
in this convention insofar as their activities and conventions consorted 
with the expectations and pragmatism of their governors.
Subsequently, legal positivists, unable to conceive of law otherwise 
than Bentham, Salmond and others, have found in Blackstone’s Oxford 
lectures, published as the Commentaries, support for their thesis. Denying 
Locke’s argument that ultimate power rested with the people, who might 
in circumstances abolish it and begin again, the Commentaries characterise 
Parliament as ‘that absolute despotic power’. What the positivists have 
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not noticed or taken seriously is Blackstone’s requirement that secular 
law conform with the law of nature. He clearly supposed that English 
common law did, but he held out the possibility of its ceasing to be 
binding if it did not ‘for no human law should be suffered to contradict 
these’ (Blackstone 1765: 42).  Of Locke’s social contract theory — that 
power rests in the hands of the people, and which does not commend 
itself to Blackstone — Blackstone himself states: ‘So long as the English 
constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm that the power of parliament 
is absolute and without control’ (1765: 157).  And in what consists the 
essence of that constitution? ‘It is highly necessary for preserving the 
balance of the constitution that the executive power should be a branch, 
though not the whole of the legislature’ (Blackstone 1765: 149).  This 
is how the safety of the people is to be maintained. Since Locke, like 
Blackstone and Hume, considers the good of the people the end of 
government, there seems little between them.
Of course Locke was too cautious a writer, having already guessed 
correctly the reactionary revolutionary intentions of James II, to 
have meant to write a revolutionary tract. The construction and 
maintenance of a social order and also ‘of melting it down and making 
all new’, as Lady Mordaunt remarked to Locke (Morduant in Laslett 
1965: 58), was of a piece with his other preoccupations — reading 
and advising on how a gentleman should best be educated — when 
composing the Treatises that took him into exile in the 1670s. The 
sections in the Second Treatise in regard to the dissolution of government 
are confident that such an exercise will not be undertaken lightly. A 
gentleman, though, must be taught early and thoroughly the elements 
of civic humanity:
Education literally humanizes the child by bringing him to reason and 
virtue, the  defining marks of man, and of that community of mankind 
which was so important … virtue is important to a gentleman; (Locke’s) 
concern also had a deeper and more dynamic motive that virtue was the very 
fabric and basis for humanity (Locke in Yolton & Yolton 1989: 25, 39).
The Yoltons argue that education and the exercise of responsible 
citizenship are indissoluble; in effect, this is what makes Locke an 
141
Sovereignty
optimist and, without being too teleological, a proto-liberal, denying 
Hobbes’s dread that without authoritarianism anarchy and the war of all 
against all will prevail. As a scientist and a political writer committed to 
progress and change, Locke was aware that disagreement was essential 
but that it must be constructively managed. ‘Tis not the owning of 
one’s dissent from another that I speak against, but the manner of doing 
it’ (Locke in Yolton & Yolton 1989: 205).
Carriage, deportment, grace and an agreeable manner of 
disagreeing were all vital ingredients of social cohesion, the foundation 
of the evolving constitution about which Edmund Burke (1775) was 
later to be so eloquent, underlying law, grasped adequately, scorning 
lawyers’ understandings as too literal, ignoring its central character 
of compromise and change. Burke insisted that beneath the literal 
constitution existed fundamental dictates of prudence and the shifting 
customs and expectations of the people. Thus if the Americans had 
come to understand their assemblies as co-equal with Westminster 
under the Crown, it would be foolish to insist on Westminster 
sovereignty. This way of approaching government was anticipated by 
Locke’s pupil, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who wrote extensively 
about the importance of manners, politeness and the avoidance of 
enthusiasm and dogmatism for stability, liberty and the peaceful 
exchange of views (Klein 1994, Cooper 1999). Their positions were 
thoroughly vindicated when the Americans’ efforts to establish a 
federation under George III, giving the colonial assemblies a status 
equal to that of Westminster, were rejected by a British ministry that 
seemed to have abandoned earlier Whig principles.
Burke, throughout his political writings and speeches, epitomised 
Whig philosophy. Whether in Britain, America, France or India, 
a government capable of claiming its subjects’ loyalty must be so 
constituted as to reflect their habits and expectations, commerce and 
religious practices. ‘Nations’, he wrote, ‘are not primarily ruled by laws: 
less by violence … the temper of the people amongst whom he presides 
ought therefore to be the first study of the statesman’ (Burke 1770). 
Technically, no doubt, Westminster had the right to tax the colonies, just 
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as the monarch had the right to veto the Houses’ legislation, but both 
in Burke’s estimation would be equally ill-judged. No one, no body, 
occupied a space of exception from the norms of its community. No 
body, not the legislature nor the Crown, had arbitrary power to exercise, 
in anybody’s name. Warren Hastings’s arrogation to his Governor-
Generalship of Bengal of, as Burke saw it, a Hobbesian sovereignty was 
mere mysticism, dictatorship. The French assembly attempted to assume 
sovereignty under the heading of the General Will and, as Burke (1910) 
correctly predicted, that attempt would lead to a tyranny much worse 
than the clumsy and incompetent administration of Bourbon absolutism. 
The British betrayed the Americans and, had the revolutionary war 
turned out differently, would have produced a tyranny policed largely, 
one supposes, with mercenaries recruited from Germany.
The arrogance that followed the United Kingdom’s sudden 
precipitation to global dominance after the Seven Years’ War in 
1757, and particularly the victories of Clive, Munro and others on 
the Indian sub-continent, of course, produced the hubris of America. 
Civil libertarian movements at home, revolutionary ideology from 
across the channel, changing work practices and the responses of 
workers to those — well-documented elsewhere — produced two 
quite different responses. One was fairly swift and repressive and 
fed off Benthamite utilitarianism and Malthusian political economy. 
Notoriously, Thomas Malthus, lecturer at Haileybury, the college for 
aspiring Indian Civil Servants, felt that the unemployed who could 
not attract charity must starve to death. In Malthus’s words, for such 
a person, ‘at nature’s mighty feast here is no cover for him’ (quoted in 
Hollander 1997: 896). As for Benthamite utilitarianism, Eric Stokes 
(1959: 177) remarks that ‘Bentham found himself more at home 
with the enlightened despots than turbulent assemblies, for is not the 
legislator in some sense necessarily single and despotic?’
The poor, the resistants, even the sick and the old, were to be, if 
we can put it so, panopticised. But India, as many have noted, was a 
laboratory, always paternalistic. But paternalism takes different forms 
and may be highly desirable in some. I may be called a ‘guest’ on some 
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airlines, but I want my behaviour to be organised on my ignorant behalf 
should something amiss occur. Slick university advertising identifies 
students as ‘customers’, adopting the fiction that consumers can always 
make informed choices, but in that case one wonders why their professors, 
rather than themselves, are organising the courses. In India, Thomas 
Macaulay initiated the process of legal codification; its design, long before 
its implementation which was decades after Macaulay’s departure from 
India, was interestingly pedagogical, the normative formula followed 
by examples of how it would apply (Clive 1987). His alternative and not 
entirely original or unanticipated plan for the ordering of millions by a 
few thousands of white administrative supervisors was for the education of 
‘a suitable class’ of Indians in English, who might then transmit European 
rationality to the educable remainder in their various vernaculars. As 
Legal Officer to the Supreme Council of India in Calcutta, Macaulay’s 
famous Minute of 1835 initiated the enterprise.
In 1833, before setting out for India, Macaulay had announced his 
vision of the imperial enterprise to the House of Commons:
Victory may be inconstant to our arms. But there are victories which 
are followed by no reverse. There is an empire exempt from all causes of 
decay. Those triumphs are the pacific triumphs of reason over barbarism; 
that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts, and our morals, our 
literature and our laws (Macaulay in Ellis 1889: 572).
As a later administrator was to put it in 1838, subjugating the 
population of the sub-continent by force was impractical, even with 
the huge army of Indian troops the East India Company was recruiting; 
policing them by law, ‘the gospel of the English, the sum and substance 
of what we have to teach them’, in James Fitzjames Stephen’s pious 
intonation, was difficult (Cocks 1988: 87). This was especially so 
because, as Maine noted, the wily locals delighted in the subtle 
argument that imported common and codified English law permitted. 
The rascals could outwit their masters, indeed (Cocks 1988: 90). The 
answer, according to the company official JR Farich, was to convince 
Indians that some form of cultural assimilation was the wisest, most 
improving strategy for them (Viswananthan 1997: 113).
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To write that there was mutual benefit is risky, like a Jewish 
joke related by a non-Jew. Macaulay’s biographer insists that English 
learning was a turning point in India’s intellectual development 
(Trevelyan 1876: 486). If that is too gushing, India was a multicultural 
society and Bengalis, at least, did not have to reject their own learning 
and language in order to appreciate yet another. Furthermore, the 
company’s early appetite for credit gave every incentive for Indian 
bankers to learn the language of their debtors.
But my point is Pennycook’s: ‘colonialism needs to be seen as a 
primary site of cultural production whose products have flowed back’ 
(Pennycook 1998: 35). Macaulay returned to an England now almost 
as complex as the India he had perceived, and searched for a remedy 
consistent with English Whig rule. Educational assimilation for a 
‘suitable class’ with downward influence was, of course, the answer.
Some little time later, in the early 1840s, he rejected the second 
Chartist demands for the vote on the grounds that the working class was 
insufficiently educated to make informed choices and would become 
prey to demagogues and opportunists. Further into the 1840s he is 
advocating government sponsorship of elementary education so that 
the working classes might be so informed. His 1833 speech on India 
followed an important essay by Samuel Taylor Coleridge four years 
earlier (Coleridge 1990). Coleridge, a former radical and sympathiser, 
with Wordsworth, with the French revolutionary cause, retained 
two concerns about the oppressed and exploited. One was that they 
would bring revolution, which seemed at the time not impossible; the 
second, and increasingly important for Coleridge, was that they were 
owed a duty. Everyone, to paraphrase Coleridge somewhat radically, 
should be given the pastoral support and pedagogical opportunity to 
better themselves. Like the Scottish Kirk, which paid for a school in 
each parish, the English state should ‘educe’, in his words, the best in 
everyone — draw out the best in every boy and girl.
Matthew Arnold — intellectual, schools inspector and professor 
of poetry at Oxford — would repeat the admonition: it is not by law, 
the utilitarian way; it is by educing, ‘improving’, assimilation, and 
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the holding out of all that is best in the world, that civilisation will 
progress. Sadly, for the 1970s Marxists, who wished retrospectively for 
the smashing of the capitalist state, the autodidacts of the working class, 
the self-improved and those they wished to have as allies, wanted to join 
the state, to exercise the vote and have representatives in parliament, 
to change state policy from within. Arnold, both like and unlike 
Macaulay, saw in this apparently inevitable trend to greater democracy 
pressing pedagogical problems, but also opportunities. The mob was 
undoubtedly unruly, in need of both instruction and leadership — the 
colonial mindset is clear in this thinking — but the aristocracy, the 
long-traditional leaders of society (Arnold’s ‘barbarians’), are in his 
estimation in serious decline in a number of ways. What is necessary 
is a middle class capable of replacing them. From the aristocracy the 
country learned not only individualism and chivalry but politeness 
and grace, courage and self-confidence (Lipman 1994: 72). Arnold’s 
scorn for the contemporary middle class, his ‘philistines’, was that they 
had no program equivalent to that of the now archaic leadership of the 
barbarians — nothing to offer the mob who would soon rule. They had 
nothing but a petit bourgeois model of vocational training, so licensed 
grocers and commercial travellers would teach their children no civic 
skills beyond those of the trades of making money (Lipman 1994: 80, 
Paul 1902: 128–9). Arnold’s travels in France and Prussia convinced 
him that nation-building required a cultured middle class committed to 
transmitting civility, as Macaulay put it, but more — a desire for learning 
for its own sake that would calm society and lift its gaze, not entirely, 
but to a civilising extent, from money-grubbing and brawling.
He was at one with JS Mill:
We were now much less democrats than we had been, because as long 
as education continues to be so wretchedly imperfect, we dreaded the 
ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass (Mill 
1989: 175).
In Macaulay, shall we say, more faintly, but in Coleridge, Arnold 
and Mill most definitely, the social fabric of the empire, the one overseas 
and the one at home, was to be preserved by education. In Friendship’s 
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Garland, Arnold has his intellectual mouthpiece, the Prussian Arminius 
comment acidly on the contrast between the German commitment 
to learning in higher education and the trade school mentality of 
the English. The England of the time was assaulted on many fronts. 
Eighteenth-century Scots had inspired higher learning in both pre- 
and post-revolutionary America. One thinks of John Witherspoon 
— academic, Scottish emigrant to what would be the United States, 
signatory to the Declaration of Independence — and the debt which 
both Hegel and Marx acknowledge to the Scots, their universities and 
their dedication to scholarship. Both Prussia and the United States 
were challenging British global supremacy and industrial leadership 
by the 1860s, when Arnold was writing, and research and education 
seemed part of this dynamism. Additionally, Edward Freeman (1876) 
was extolling the debt owed by the English to the free institutions of 
the Teutonic forests, brought with the ‘Saxon’ invasions following the 
withdrawal of the Roman legions.
When Germanophobia surfaced with the German Empire’s brief 
challenge to Royal Navy supremacy, and, of course, during and after 
World War I, two perceptions emerged. One was that, pace Arnold, it 
was not central European philosophy and its support for disinterested 
learning — and its technological spin-off — but its authoritarian 
manifestation in the form of state sovereignty and its constitionally 
unconstrained capability for actions of state that had made it a threat. 
Was it not the ungentlemanly Junkers, the dictatorial Kaiser and the 
weakness of the German legislature which lay at the heart of the 
problem? The second, and this is connected with the Bolshevik hazard 
unleashed by the war and embraced by many working class and some 
intellectuals in the 1920s, was that the era of capitalism was nearing 
its end. Parochially, the age of Elgar and the solidarity of squire and 
tenants joined in cricketing solidarity on the village green seemed 
under threat. The genius of Stanley Baldwin’s speeches was to invoke 
the centrality of this rural England that was in reality heavily urbanised, 
its workforce in coal, steel and ship-building still world leaders. How 
many of its inhabitants would have seen a hay-wain at dusk, smelt the 
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woodsmoke of village fires or admired the scent of wild anemones in 
spring, all tropes of Baldwin’s addresses to the nation via the BBC?
Once again this brings us back to sovereignty and the law. Of 
course, like Chartism, the General Strike was crushed by the sovereign 
state: the troops, the battleships on ‘Red Clydeside’. But the longer-
term solution was, as Coleridge, Macaulay and Arnold had foreseen, 
cultural assimilation. Certainly not homogeneity but, as in India, those 
who could must learn and believe in the canon which mythology 
extends from Chaucer through Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth 
and innumerable others. The others must take it on trust that this 
is civilisation at its highest; and satirising it, rejecting its power, 
substituting Coronation Street and especially Monty Python’s Flying Circus 
and Fawlty Towers, merely elevates its status.
This was the task begun with the ‘missions’ to the East End 
and the industrial north, and summarised in the Newbolt Report 
commissioned shortly after the Great War. Cultural studies of English 
were to lay the foundation for English identity, articulated by those 
who could be taught it and admired and held in some awe by those 
who were deemed not capable of absorbing its nuances. Science and 
technology were not of course to be neglected — the Spitfire and 
the Lancaster bomber were not produced by languid members of the 
Athenaeum between the fish and the meat courses whilst rehearsing 
iambic pentameters — but the hope and largely the realisation of 
cohesion, perhaps by an inculcation of deference that one may not 
subscribe to, was education in English as a cultural study. English 
professors were to be the ‘ambassadors’ of culture, and so they proved 
to be, taught by Adam Smith and his progenitors in the Scottish Kirk 
— Scots who, like the Irish, taught the English how to be.
My final point here is to repeat some themes. Arnold’s admiration 
for the Prussian system of higher learning was generous, long-sighted 
and a progressive warning to the UK that the partial loss of the 
Scottish momentum for the country as a whole was unwise. Macaulay 
made the same point. But Arnold missed the sinisterly developing 
role of the cult of the volk that seemed to its rulers essential to meld a 
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heterogeneous political system into a powerful and culturally unified 
nation. This required, it seemed, the strong form of sovereignty to 
cement the historically diverse German principalities and ultimately, of 
course, Anschluss with Austria. English experiments with sovereignty 
of that kind have not, as we have seen, been happy. The Atlantic 
empire was lost, where a happier outcome may well have been a 
shift of political centrality to the larger continent. Perhaps not. With 
Ireland, dramatically, and for many centuries tragically, Westminster 
sovereignty was a disaster; and more softly than the convulsions of 
1776 or 1921, Scotland and Wales were peacefully if not finally yet 
devolved. Unlike Australia and the United States, the British Isles 
have no claim to nationhood. As they drift apart, as drift they may 
well, according to Linda Colley (1994) any connecting relations, any 
commonality, will be the product rather than the foundation of further 
cultural relations. I do not share the pessimism her remarks about the 
break-up of Britain imply, although I may misinterpret them. The 
Isles seem to me to have a future despite Blair’s complete blunder over 
Iraq, but it will not — if it includes a devolved Scotland and Wales, a 
partnership with a resurgent Irish Republic that will hopefully soon 
incorporate Ulster, and a continuance of its ties with the European 
Union — be one of sovereignty. How could it?
Foucault’s remarks seem of particular relevance here:
What I would like to show is that as an episode and transitory form, law 
itself is, rather, part of a much more general history of the techniques 
and technologies of practices of the subject with regard to himself, of 
techniques and technologies which are independent of law and which 
have priority with regard to it (Foucault 2005: 112).
He continues:
My idea is that it is not all necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific 
knowledge. (Morality could be) a very long structure of existence without 
any relation to the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a 
disciplinary structure (Foucault in Paras 2006: 140–1).
He is using ‘scientific knowledge’ not as conceived by Locke or 
Smith but as used by the guardians of the hospital, the prison and the 
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other heteronymous systems of control from which the subject may, but 
in some cases will not, escape; but as with Lacan, if there is one who 
sees and describes there must be those who reinvent themselves.
The empirical dimension of Foucault’s remarks is well described in 
both Lloyd and Thomas’s (1983) and Baldick’s (1983) account of the 
‘mission’. The former note the transition in Britain from the utilitarian 
ideal of the ‘night-watchman state’, reliant on regulation overseen by 
courts, the police and the military, to the ‘ethical state’. In the ethical 
state, the subject constructs him- or herself additionally by means of 
trades unions, the workplace, charities and schools. And, we could add, 
the ‘English heritage’: myths, theme parks, castles, country houses and, 
perhaps, sport (Wright 1985). The girl learns to be a good wife (Clarke 
1995); the boy or girl from a respectable working-class home has to 
learn about ‘our’ culture from ‘an instructed minority’ acting as ‘tutors 
in citizenship and representatives of the state at a local level’ (Mill in 
Lloyd & Thomas 1983: 5). It is, after all, ‘not useful, but hurtful that the 
constitution of the country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as 
much power as knowledge’ (Mill 1991: 188). Mill’s middle class, like 
Arnold’s, must ‘establish its intellectual authority’ (Mill 1976: 184).
In the aftermath of the Great War, barrister (and, it is generally 
acknowledged, bad poet) Sir Henry Newbolt was charged with the 
task of re-identifying the nation (HMSO 1921). He and his colleagues 
wanted a formula to govern the UK, as Macaulay wanted one to govern 
India — by cultural assimilation and a possibly endlessly deferred 
promise of self-government. Why they chose the English discipline as 
their medium has an irony which those fashionably hostile to cultural 
studies would doubtless miss. Initially the motive was xenophobic. 
England and English were no longer Germanic, but as Leavis and 
his wife and colleagues gained influence it became clear that, absent 
xenophobia, the English discipline as cultural studies had an enormous 
advantage, certainly over other arts disciplines. It had long been 
the primary curriculum in women’s and teachers’ colleges, among 
working-class ‘self-improvers’ intent on familiarising themselves with 
the cultural canon. And, as Leavis et al had demonstrated, it could not 
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properly be understood without a grasp of social history, social theory 
and, if possible, comparative literature. It amounted in a word to a study 
of culture, and if the Newbolts, less so the Leavises, underestimated 
the extent to which the parvenus, women, non-Anglos, the working 
class, gays, queers and others would use the cultural skills they gained 
to urge social change, all we can say is that they opened gates that they 
did not anticipate and probably would not regret.
If we go back to Adam Smith we are reminded that legal studies 
are not a training school for business law, although there is no reason 
that they should not open a route for a career in that direction, but a 
broad study of the best that we can grasp of the social development and 
context of any normative social order. If we return to Edmund Burke 
we are reminded that there are particularities as well as critiques. To 
comprehend the English/British constitution, we have to study the 
study of its subjects; to comprehend the French, the French; and so 
on. To attempt to cut a swathe, politically or epistemologically, should 
they differ, through that tradition, or to fabricate another tradition and 
the reform each offers, is to court disaster. We know.
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